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May 31 真實界的錯覺（Delusions of Reality）
真實界的錯覺 意識形態和不可能性
Delusions of Reality Ideology and Impossibility
By Glyn Daly
Translated by 樂水
齊澤克曾非常想要表明意識形態如何使得現實看起來具體的整合的整體──沒有最初的意識形態的神秘化，現實不可能再生產。意識形態沒有隱閉或扭曲一個潛在的事實（positivity）（事物真正的一面），而是剛好相反。意識傾向於提供一個確實的一致性，以對抗真實界扭曲的和創傷性的效果(Zizek, 1989: 45) 。
Zizek has been concerned crucially to demonstrate the way in which ideology serves to support reality as a concrete fully integrated totality - reality cannot be reproduced without initial ideological mystification. Ideology does not conceal or distort an underlying positivity (the way things really are), but quite the opposite. What ideology attempts to do is provide a certain positive consistency against the distorting and traumatizing effects of the Real (Zizek, 1989: 45).
所有意識形態都將現實表示成一個完整的本體論整體，而借此壓制後者不過是個錯覺這一創傷性事實；它嘗試去消除（真實界）不可能性的所有痕跡(Zizek, 1989: 49)。一個可作為例證的形象是犬儒主義者（cynic）。典型的犬儒主義俗者是實用主義的，他們與他們真誠地持有的信念保持著距離，消除社會存在的其他選擇，把這當是年幼無知的胡鬧……為了這些，他們必須更深地依賴於「獨立的充分成形的現實」這種絕對論者（absolutist）的概念。
All ideology presents reality as a full ontological totality, and in this way tries to repress the traumatic fact that the latter is ultimately a delusion; it tries to eliminate all traces of (Real) impossibility (Zizek, 1989: 49). The exemplary figure here is that of the cynic. The typical cynic is someone who is "pragmatic", who distances themselves from sincerely held beliefs, dismisses alternative visions of social existence as so much juvenile nonsense...and who, for all that, relies even more deeply on some absolutist conception of an independent fully-formed reality. 就她／他是根本上地依賴於外在地被批准的現實（「人類本質」啊，「正如它所是的」啊等等）這概念而言，犬儒主義者確實是意識形態的主體性的一個經典模範。犬儒主義者最害怕的是失去這中立的現實（大他者），進而失去了他們對世界的理解和感受。犬儒主義著捲入在某種短路的程序中，這種程序常見於意識形態運作中：對任可類型的意識形態她／他都犬儒，除了她／他自己對客體性事實的意識形態信念。
The cynic is the very model of an ideological subjectivity insofar as s/he is radically dependent on the idea of an externally ratified reality ("human nature", "the way it is" etc.). What the cynic fears most is that they might lose the support of this independent (Other) reality and consequently their sense of "place" in the world. The cynic gets involved in a certain short-circuiting procedure that is, in fact, generic to all ideological functioning: s/he is cynical towards every kind of ideological belief except his/her own fundamentalist belief in objectivist reality. 在今天占主導地位的「後現代反諷」傾向中，犬儒態度得到更廣泛的反映。那關鍵的哲學家是富議論性的羅蒂。羅蒂希望有這樣一個世界，個人可以使用獨特的方式去自由追求私人的完美目標(Rorty, 1991: 19)，公共領域被限制在最小的範圍中，而且還是本質地審美的(Rorty, 1989: 125)。對羅蒂來說，最重要的義務是去懷疑任何社會運動（social engagement）的計劃，以防其以集體真理的名義帶來專制和殘忍，剝奪個人追求快樂的權利(參見Daly, 1994)。羅蒂立場的不一致性在於「我們」應該練習以反諷的態度去面對所有社會政治計劃，除了自由的那個：它的真實就是它的社會關係（私人／公共）的結構化代表了「最後的概念革命」(Rorty, 1989: 63)而且還有效地懸置了歷史。
The cynical attitude is more widely reflected in today's predominant inclination towards "postmodern ironizing". The key philosopher is arguably R. Rorty. Rorty wants a world where individuals are free "to pursue private perfection in idiosyncratic ways" (Rorty, 1991: 19) and where the public realm is restricted to minimal functions and is essentially aesthetic in orientation (Rorty, 1989: 125). For Rorty the central obligation is to be sceptical towards any projects of substantial social engagement for fear that it might curtail individual pursuits of happiness and lead towards despotic forms of cruelty in the name of a higher (collective) Truth (see Daly, 1994). The basic inconsistency in Rorty's position is that "we" should exercise an ironic distancing towards every socio-political project except the liberal one: the one true reality whose (private/public) structuring of social relations represents "the last conceptual revolution" (Rorty, 1989: 63) and effectively suspends history. 這也是為什麼當代的後現代思想應該被理解為嚴格的意識形態。運用它反諷的距離化，對可信姿態的懷疑等等，它更為依服於已存秩序的機能，好像己存秩序是中立的或者完美的，除此之外，這是透過符號閹割（symbolic mortification）來保存本體論之夢。換句話來，它含有意識形態（「我們知道這沒什麼現實，但我們卻相信它」）的真正形式。
This is why so much of what passes for contemporary postmodern thought should be understood as strictly ideological in character. With all its ironic distancing, disavowals of the authentic gesture and so on, it relies even more heavily on the functioning of the existing order as if it were a naturalistic, or immaculate, Other - a kind of preservation of the ontological dream through symbolic mortification. In other words, it tends to involve the very form of ideological identification which is formulated along the lines of "we know very well that there is no such thing as Reality but nonetheless we believe in it". 事實說明它不能陳述一個完全整合的社會秩序，那麼，意識形態如果對付其內在的不可能性？齊澤克的答案是意識形態傾向於使不可能具化化成某種外在的障礙；將社會自身的不可能性轉化為社會裡的偷竊或陰謀(see Daly, 1999)。先驗的不可能性被投射進偶然的歷史性他者（比如，在納粹意識形態裡的猶太人他者），如此一來，那個失去了／被盜的客體（社會和諧／純潔）會好像可挽救的了；當然，那個客體我們從來未曾擁有過。透過將不可能－真實界等同於某特定的他者（猶太人，巴勒斯坦人，吉普賽人，移民……），通過（想像的或其他形式的）消滅／壓制他者，對完整性的幻想才能維持下來。
So how does ideology deal with its immanent impossibility, with the fact that it cannot deliver a fully integrated social order? Zizek's answer is that ideology attempts to reify impossibility into some kind of external obstacle; to fantasmatically translate the impossibility of Society into the theft, or sabotage, of Society (see Daly, 1999). Transcendental impossibility is projected into some contingent historicised Other (e.g. the figure of "the Jew" in Nazi ideology) in such a way that the lost/stolen object (social harmony/purity) appears retrievable; an object which, of course, "we" have never possessed. By synonymizing the impossible-Real with a particular Other (Jews, Palestinians, Gypsies, immimgrants...), the fantasy of holistic fulfillment through the (imagined or otherwise) elimination/suppression of the Other is thereby sustained. 齊澤克最近還給這種想法一個幾劇烈的扭曲。意識形態不僅僅表現了一個完整性的理想（柏拉圖的理型世界，哈貝馬斯的透明的現代性，羅蒂的自由烏托邦，多元文化主義的和諧之類），它同時至關重要地服務於調整與它的距離。意識形態的悖論在於它預先給預了一個與原質（Thing）（完全的完整）的和解，但內置的限定條款叫我們不要太近地靠近它。精神分析為此提供的理由非常清晰簡單：如果你靠原質太近，它可能不可補救地破裂了（像電子圖像一樣），或者正如康德主義的崇高那樣，產生了一種難以承受的焦慮和精神的崩潰。
Zizek has recently given this perspective a further more radical twist. Thus ideology not only presents a certain ideal of holistic fulfilment (Plato's Republic of Reason, Habermas' transparent modernity, Rorty's liberal utopia, multiculturalist harmony and so on), it also serves crucially to regulate a certain distance from it. The paradox of ideology is that it advances a particular fantasy of being reconciled with the Thing (of total fulfilment) but with the built-in proviso that we do not come too close to it. The psychoanalytic reason for this is clear: if you come too close to the Thing it either fragments irretrievably (like a digitally produced image) or, as in the Kantian sublime, produces unbearable anxiety and psychical disintegration.
關鍵之處是意識形態總是已經反身地參加在它的不可能性中。不可能性是透過意識形態所接合的，它兩者建構了現實和建立了「什麼被認為是可能」的感覺。這裡我們有一個雙重解讀。首先，將不可能性轉譯成某些外在障礙（他者）。然後的是一個更深入的階段，意識形態的客體本身在這裡被提升到不可能的狀態──為了防了任何與它直接的遭遇。
The point is that ideology is always already engaged reflexively with its own impossibility. Impossibility is articulated through ideology and in such a way that it both structures reality and establishes the very sense of what is considered possible. Here we have a double inscription. First there is the basic operation of translating impossibility into an external obstacle (an Other). But second, there is a further deeper stage whereby the ideological objective itself is elevated to the status of impossibility precisely as a way of avoiding any direct encounter with it (see Zizek & Daly, 2003). 意識形態透過聚焦原質來保持一個批評性的距離，但為了防止它扭曲和破碎，又不能靠得原質太近(參見see Daly, 1999: 235)。一個例子是某人幻想某種理想的客體（一個性愛情節，一次晉升，一場公開演出等等），而當他們真的遇到客體，他們只能典型性地遇到客體的去－理想化；真實界的回歸。然而，與客體保持一定距離，意識形態維持著從完整整體的幻想中獲得的滿足：「只要我獲得ｘ，我就能夠圓我的夢！」意識形態是個不可能的夢，不單純是克服不可能性，而是將不可能性建構成讓人接受的樣子；透過一種能從擁有和享用蛋糕獲得快樂的方法。克服不可能性這概念是作為實現的延期而存在的，但不用去經歷這克服的痛苦。意識形態調整這個幻想性的距離，來避開難以忍受（真實改變所帶來的創傷）的真實界。
Ideology seeks to maintain a critical distance by keeping the Thing in focus but without coming so close that it begins to distort and fragment (see Daly, 1999: 235). The paradigmatic example is of someone who fantasises about an ideal object (a sexual scenario, a promotion, a public performance etc.) and when they actually encounter the object they are typically confronted with a de-idealisation of the object; a return of the Real . By keeping the object at a certain distance, however, ideology sustains the satisfaction derived from the fantasy of holistic fulfilment: "if only I had x I could achieve my dream". Ideology is the impossible dream not simply in terms of overcoming impossibility but of constructing the latter in an acceptable way; in a way that itself yields a certain satisfaction of both having and eating the cake. The idea of overcoming impossibility is subsists as a deferred moment of realisation but without having to go through the pain of overcoming as such. Ideology regulates this fantasmatic distance as a way of avoiding the Real in the impossible - the trauma involved in any real change. 我們可以談談伊拉克和所謂新世界秩序（New World Order）這些案例。伴隨著廣闊的軍事調度，廣泛的社會劇變以及可怕的人類成本，入侵伊拉克正是為了使西方－美國結構的社會經濟力量繼續以一個相對無干擾的情況下運作。當入侵一開始因國際安全而被正當化，儘管後來深刻地缺乏證據，但這還是被加工成一個解放運動的計劃。而在此，我們獲得了意識形態的扭曲：「我們在此自由化／民主化伊拉克……但我們知道在當前的（任何的）環境下這些是無法完整實行的。」因此對伊拉克還是全付武裝的占領。這個訊息是：「理論上（你可以獲得自由解放），可能；現實上，不可能。」
Let's take the case of Iraq and the so-called New World Order. With extensive military mobilisation, widespread social upheaval and a terrible human cost, the invasion of Iraq was undertaken precisely in order that the underlying structures of Western-U.S. socio-economic power can continue to function in a relatively undisturbed way. While the invasion was initially justified on the grounds of international security this has, subsequent to a profound lack of evidence, been largely rearticulated in terms of a project of emancipation. And it is here that we get the ideological twist: "we are here to liberate/democratise Iraq...while recognising that a full implementation of the latter is impossible under present (any) circumstances". Thus the occupation of Iraq continues in full force. The message is, "in principle (you can have liberation), yes; in reality, no". 這就是那個有效地阻止任何真正了解社會客體的延期的隱藏條款。順著福特的那句有名的宣言(「你能夠擁有你喜歡的任何顏色，只要它是黑的」)，我們可以看到同樣的被逼選擇正在上演：「伊拉克人民可以獲得他們所想要的所有民主，獲得對他們的石油和自然資源的控制……只要它是模仿歐美的自由資本主義，只要它不要破壞歐美的利益」。
It is this hidden clause of deferral that effectively prevents any real attempt to realise the publicly stated objective. Along the lines of Henry Ford's famous declaration ("you can have any colour you like, as long as it's black") we see the same kind of forced choice at play: "the Iraqi people can have all the democracy they want, all the popular control over their oil and natural resources...as long as it is modelled on U.S.-Western liberal capitalism, as long as it does not undermine U.S.-Western interests". 透過新世界秩序，我們看到一個類似意識形態的過程。任何真誠地想要實現這樣的秩序需要大量的（創傷性的）改變：權力共享，消滅貧困和社會排外問題，平等權利／參與的全球化等等，作為構成整體所需要的反身的（reflexive）元素。現實中，新世界秩序只是個例行公事般的模糊理想，阻礙任何真正邁向它的進步。類似的意識形態條款正在秘密地起作用：「我們正在邁向新世界秩序，它不會寬容像薩達姆．侯賽恩這樣的人……雖然意識到暫時／總是不可能去真實地實行這種秩序（這不會寬容所有獨裁者和共同合作的奸商／專政）。」如此一來，不可能性的範疇在當下的現實政治（用今天的犬儒主義聲明來說是諸事物實際上的樣子）中運作得如同隱性的－淫穢的意識形態補遺。
With New World Order discourse we see a similar ideological process. Any genuine attempt to realise such an order would involve massive (traumatic) changes: power sharing, the eradication of poverty and systematic social exclusion, a globalisation of equal rights/participation and so on, as integral reflexive elements. In reality, the New World Order is routinely conjured as an indefinite ideal that serves precisely to prevent any real movement towards it. The same type of ideological clause is secretly functioning: "we are moving towards a New World Order that will not tolerate the Saddam Husseins of this world...while recognising that a true implementation of such an order (one that would be intolerant of all the autocrats and corporate profiteers/dictatorships) is currently/always impossible". In this way, the category of impossibility itself functions as an implicit-obscene ideological supplement in today's realpolitik; in today's cynical assertion of the way things actually are.
May 29 接觸真實界（The Touch of the Real）
接觸真實界
The Touch of the Real
By Glyn Daly
Translated by 樂水
激進否定性就是以後拉康常常所描述的「真實界」：一個終極的所指(signified)，在此周圍，意指作用(signification翻譯參考http://blog.yam.com/invisible/archives/387219.html)被建造出來，與此同時，意指作用也遇到它的極限和不可迴避的失敗。像在其他地方已經很好地指出的那樣(e.g. Fink, 1995)，真實界無法避免與符號界及想像界的連結，這三者也為所有人類形成了基要的三位一體結構。一般來說，符號界和想像界從屬意指作用的規則。符號界指的是對意指作用（像語言和符號）的無限使用，想像界指的是一些具體途徑，使得意指作用受誘於某些基要的圖像，而這圖像使我們獲得在世上的位置和一致性。通過想像界，我們獲得某種形式的身份（identification），而這使我們能夠解決一些基本問題：對他人來說，我們是誰；我們圍繞我們想與之認同的或想去計劃獲得的基礎圖像來描述自己。
另一方面，真實界不僅不從屬於意指作用的秩序，而且還關鍵地代表其否定。真實界毋庸是抗拒任何意指作用過程的先驗的（和建構性的）維度。這個先驗方面的東西並不是簡單地屬於後現代思潮。比如，根據巴特勒的說法，真實界這個概念──作為某種不能整合到符號裡面去的東西──已經是邏輯上不一致的：「宣稱真實界抗拒符號化已經是將真實界符號化成了一種抗拒。前一個宣稱（真實界抗拒符號化）是真的前提是後一個宣稱為真（「真實界抗拒符號化」本身就是符號化），但當第二個宣稱是真的時候，第一個宣稱就只能是錯的。」(Butler, 1993: 207)
換句話說，如果你將某東西放置在符號化的外面，你所能做的只是透過符號化本身。但正如齊澤克指出的那樣，真實界不能被想成某種外在性（或超越性？──譯者註）的實體（這會立即調用到巴特勒所暗示的：以待决之问题为论据petitio principii）。真實界其實嚴格地是內在於失敗的一個點，是個內在的限度。於是，與其說我們有了個邏輯矛盾，不如說我們獲得了個悖論： 「這個悖論……是，在程度上說巴特勒是對的：當然，真實界事實上是內在／內在一致於符號界的，不是其外在的極限，但由於極端的理由，它不能被符號化。換句話說，悖論在於作為外在於被排除於符號界之外的真實界事實上是一個符號的決斷──逃避符號化的正是作為符號化失敗的內在點的真實界。」(Zizek in Butler et al, 2000: 121)
真實界是透過符號界運作失敗來被經驗到的。我們透過不能符號化的點接觸真實界；透過創傷、厭惡、斷裂之類不確定性的標記，在這裡，符號界無法陳述一個內在一致的現實。因為真實界無法被直接地表徵──因此有了拉康的格言「真實裡沒有東西是缺乏的」（缺乏只能透過某種形式的符號化才能被明確陳述，但在激進的否定性裡，這就變得毫無意義了）──它被表示為符號的失敗和被暗喻成那些預示非整合性的恐怖－過度的又修飾豐富的化身（像怪獸，自然的力量或者疾病／疾毒之類的東西）。
舒馬赫的Flatliners（台譯別闖陰陽界／港譯靈異空間）可以作為例證。該影片說到一群醫學學生想──以一種浮士德主義的方法──刺探死亡的秘密，他們停止了彼此的心臟的跳動，打算一段時間後使它們恢復跳動。在死亡的那點，每個學生都開始一段幻想的旅行，帶他們達到了符號──想像世界的極度邊界。當他們到達那條邊界，他們發現的不是什麼終極真理而是否定的獨特標記：一個不能在他們的符號世界裡得以解決或馴化的難以忍受的相遇，於是他們絕望地嘗試去逃跑，想醒過來回到現實。他們不斷的探索為他們帶來的遠不是一個實證的秘密或明確的突破，反而是讓他們面對一個徹底模糊的和無法超越的激進否定性。這也是為什麼我們會說那些理性主義者（啟蒙運動者）主體性失敗了，而且還使其被逼創傷性地接近作為世界之夜的主體；在這裡，它遭遇到作為真實界的答案的主體。
在他的早期著作中，齊澤克傾向於聚焦於作為意指作用的極限的真實界。最近，齊澤克發展了一套關於真實界的更微妙更仔細的讀法。跟隨拉康主義的三位一體結構，齊澤克強調在真實界裡也其實有三個基要的秩序：真實的真實界，符號的真實界和想像的真實界(Zizek & Daly, 2003; Zizek, 2002: xii; Zizek, 2001b: 82-83)。真實的真實界是像恐怖的東西那樣運作的極限（外國人，梅杜莎的頭，漩渦之類）──否定的粉碎力量。符號的真實界指的是匿名（非主體化的？──譯者註）的符號和代碼（科學公式，數碼化，空的能指），它以一種無差異的態度來運作，正如一種抽象的「質地」，在此之內或之外，真實得以組成。例如在The Matrix（港譯二十世紀殺人網絡──譯者註）中，符號的真實界是尼奧根據數碼流而察知的真實。在當代，齊澤克指出，正是資本為我們的真實給出了必要的背景，同樣也表徵著我們時代的符號的真實界(Zizek, 1999: 222; 276)。
就想像的真實界而言，我們在Flatliners發現了這樣一個幻想的過量－否定的（不可獲得的）維度。這也是為什麼賽博空間是如此的一個模糊的想像領域。一眼看去，它好像不受真實界影響──是個無限想像底自由浮動空間。但正是透過賽博空間，我們才能如此點撃以致被無能忍受地帶往我們最原初的恐懼和焦慮中：投向某些圖像／實踐的嘔心－迷戀；病態的妄想；一個與大他者的令人無法忍受的關連（「我真的是喜歡它們／他們嗎？」）。
這就是齊澤克所強調的關於９１１事件的真實界(Zizek, 2001c)。發生的事並不是真實界闖入美國和諧的想像世界中，而毋庸是想像的過量闖進了現實(Zizek, 2001c: 18)。使得恐怖主義襲擊如此震驚就是這個想像的真實界──這個浩劫式破壞的惡夢般的過量（在很多的荷里活巨型炸彈裡已得到了預演），而在這裡我們沒什麼醒來可言；我們無法將其留在戲院，然後一走了之。在這個意義上，對９１１的創傷性影響的描述也是雙重的：它是一個可怕的物質事件，以及在更激烈的程度上說，它是一個跨維度的違越，一個對潛意識禁令的基礎性違反（惡夢幻想本應該「停在那裡」，不追逼我們）。
It is particularly this aspect of the Real that Zizek emphasises in relation to 9/11 (Zizek, 2001c). What happened there was not so much that (Real) reality intruded into the fantasy world of US harmony, but rather that a certain fantasmatic excess intruded into reality (Zizek, 2001c: 18). What was so shocking about the WTC attack was this aspect of the imaginary Real - this nightmarish excess of apocalyptic destruction (already prefigured in numerous Hollywood blockbusters) - from which "we" could not awaken; could not leave behind in the cinema. In this way, the traumatic impact of September 11 could be said to have been doubly inscribed: as a terrible physical event and, even more intensely, as a trans-dimensional breach, a fundamental transgression of the subliminal injunction that the nightmare fantasy should "stay there!" and not come after us. 核心的要點是：真實界確實內在於現實。兩者之間的關係不是空間的而是維度的；是共有的污點之一。正如齊澤克所指出的，現實是由某種「真實界的扭曲」所產生的──一種構成性的不可能被扭曲進入現實中（像眩目的陽光只能透過超越照明來產生了照明效果，而只能斜看才能察覺其輪廓）──真實界本身僅是「現實的扭曲」(Zizek, 2002: xvii)，它通過所謂的現實這扭曲的世界來發光。
真實界總是在現實中又超過現實。現實是由無法與其合為一體的過量所維持的（在喉嚨中咽住的骨）。回到Matrix，這不是說一方面我們有了現實，另一方面又有一個潛在地可移除的「心智碎片」（"splinter in your mind"）扭曲了它。毋寧說，現實本身就是就是這個心智碎片的結果。現實中的扭曲之所以總是可能的，是因為現實就是最基礎性的扭曲，而這意味著它永不可能與自身相同；永不能完成一個存在論意義上的完滿，但總是保有維持和超越它的傾向。
這種觀點底切了對精神分析的標準批評，這種批評認為精神分析不過是它時代（維多利亞時代的症狀／維也納的壓抑）的產物，或者是有利於處理個人問題但無力分析集體世界。齊澤克所要表明的是這種批評遺漏了（康德主義─黑格爾主義）精神分析的先驗轉向──在此，沒有個人／集體的二分法。誠如他所說：「精神分析學的焦點是完全不錯的：社會──社會決定的信念和社會實踐的領域──不只是與個人經濟處於不同層面，而恰恰是個人必須關係到的東西，是個人所必須經驗的最小限度的具體秩序(Zizek, 2002 : lxxii)。
問題毋寧是，客觀世界（"objective world"）如何結織良好以致主體性得以可能（反之亦然）？精神分析的反應是：主體和客體都應該被當作是連續統一體的（不穩定的）維度，而這連續統一體被不可能的真實界所橫斷。人類的基本性條件是，客體性和主體性缺乏過量，透過阻止過量，他們嘗試去獲得平衡和相互的安心（homeostasis and mutual reassurance）。這意味著我們永遠不能站在一個自然中立的基礎上。我們總是在最小程度上捲入某種關於真實界的傾向；一個總是要被捲入潛在傾向的排除和壓抑之中。在此強調，人類是政治動物正是因為那裡沒有預先給予的／本質論的現實，而言總是被偽造成一個錯覺般的一致性。正是基於這現實的錯覺般的一致性，齊澤克建立了一個對意識形態的徹底的批判。
The question is rather, how does the "objective world" have to be organised in order for something like "subjectivity" to be possible (and vice versa)? The psychoanalytic response is that both subjective and objective should be considered as (unstable) dimensions of a continuum that is traversed by the impossible Real. The basic human condition is that both objectivity and subjectivity are lacking towards an excess and against which they try to achieve homeostasis and mutual reassurance. This means that we can never stand on neutral ground. We are always minimally engaged in some kind of orientation in respect of the Real; one that necessarily involves the repression/exclusion of alternative potential orientations. To reiterate, the human being is a political animal precisely because there is no pre-given/substantialist reality and that this always has to be forged as a matter of delusional consistency. It is in the context of this essential delusional (in)consistency of reality that Zizek has developed a thoroughgoing critique of ideology.
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